Macroeconomic Effects of the Population Ageing Phenomenon by Cristian Bulete
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Doctoral school of finance and banking
Dissertation





Professor Mois˘ a Alt˘ ar
July 2010Abstract
In the next decades, Romania will experience demographic changes that are
likely to have a signiﬁcant impact on its economic development. Using an
overlapping generations model in the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ tradition, I attempt
to assess the eﬀects of the ageing population phenomenon. The driving force
of the model is the population evolution which is imposed as exogenous and
is based on projections from Eurostat. The study is not designed to pro-
vide precise forecasts but rather a set of economic trends which are likely
to be induced by the demographic transition. Simulations covering the next
100 years were conducted under two alternative scenarios, depending on the
method of balancing the social security budget. First, I assume the contri-
bution rate adjusts in order to cover the growing ﬁnancing needs. Second,
the contribution rate is constant and the pension to wage ratio (and indi-
rectly the pension) adjusts. The possibility of increasing the retirement age
was also considered. The results conﬁrm that the population ageing has a
greater impact in the ﬁrst scenario.1 Introduction
In the last decades, the world’s countries experienced persistent demo-
graphic shifts. According to current projections signiﬁcant changes in the
features of the populations will continue well into the future. For some of
the countries, the changes imply an increase of the share of older individuals
in total population, which characterizes the population ageing phenomenon.
The main causes of population ageing are considered to be the decline
in fertility rates and the increase in life expectancy, which contribue to a
constantly rising median age. These two factors are also associated with
diminishing population growth rates, with negative values for some countries.
The process is aﬀecting large parts of the world, but its timing and magni-
tude diﬀer substantially. According to United Nations Population Division1,
the ratio of the population aged 65 years or over to the population aged 15-64
for Europe will increase from 24 in 2010 to 47 in 2050. For the Eastern Eu-
rope region2 the ratio will go from 19 to 43, while for Romania it will reach
49, from a current value of 21. The magnitude of the ageing population pro-
cess for Romania is similar in a projection provided by a diﬀerent institution.
Figure 1 illustrates the future evolution of the ratio of population aged 61
years or over to the population aged 21 or over, according to Europop2008
projection from Eurostat.
The interest in the demographic transition as the topic of this paper is
easily justiﬁed on one hand by the extent of the phenomenon for Romania,
and on the other hand by standard economic theory consequences of ageing
on economic development. The most obvious is the direct eﬀect on the labor
force, since intensiﬁcation of ageing diminishes the active population. The
labor force shrinkage is also determined (perhaps even to a higher degree) by
the evolution of total population, which is projected to drop by more than
1World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision
2Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania,
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine
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Figure 1: Diﬀerent age groups evolution in the Europop2008 population
projection
B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2006) suggest the analysis of the ageing eﬀects from
two perspectives, namely a macroeconomic and a microeconomic point of
view. Accordingly, from the macroeconomic perspective, the capital to labor
ratio will rise, leading to higher marginal productivity of labor and lower
marginal productivity of capital. Thus a rise in wages is implied, simultane-
ously with a decline in interest rates.
The microeconomic perspective is concerned with agents’ saving and con-
sumption patterns over the life period and is based heavily on the life-cycle
theory. Individuals are assumed to accumulate assets while economically
active, (especially with a higher savings rate for middle-aged persons) and
3Source: Europop2008
2afterwards to dissave, or decumulate their wealth in the post-retirement pe-
riod. By aggregating the individual patterns, this view suggests that coun-
tries with a high share of population aged close to retirement will own an
abundant capital stock, but this will decline as the demographic transition
progresses and the share of individuals at the ending stages of life increases.
The eﬀects of ageing on the ﬁscal sector are of great importance. A
smaller share of active individuals determines falling ﬁscal revenues, while
the government’s health related expenditures will grow with the number of
older persons. But the main challenge of the ageing process in the ﬁscal area
is related to the social security system. The total amount of public pension
expenditure will rise while the revenues from active individuals will decrease.
For this reason pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems are being reformed,
by gradually increasing the contribution rate for the private pension system.
Another measure proposed for mitigating the problem of the pension
system is the gradual increase in the retirement age. For Romania it was
suggested that this should reach 65 years in 20304. This appears necessary
especially because the ratio of retired to active agents will accelerate around
20305. This is a particular demographic feature of Romania, due to the
fact that the generations born immediately after 1968 are signiﬁcantly more
numerous than the previous ones. The baby boom was generated by the
communist regime through legislative change, namely a decree from 1967
that banned abortion and contraception in order to stimulate population
growth.
In order to quantify some of the eﬀects of population ageing on the Roma-
nian economy in the presence of diﬀerent ﬁscal policies, I employ an overlap-
ping generations (OLG) general equilibrium model in the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ
tradition. Although initially developed for assessing the impact of ﬁscal pol-
icy changes, this methodology has proven tractable for the study of demo-
graphic transition and became a workhorse in this ﬁeld.
4This measure is stipulated in the current proposed law for pension reform
5This is observable in ﬁgure 1
3The paper draws heavily on Miles (1999), B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2006),
Krueger and Ludwig (2007) and Babeck´ y and Dybczak (2009) more recently,
with the emphasis being placed on the case of Romania. Results from the
conducted simulations, which have diﬀerent assumptions about the retire-
ment age and the way in which the social security budget is balanced, are
presented over the 2000-2100 horizon. As Babeck´ y and Dybczak (2009) also
point out, this type of study is not designed to provide a precise forecast of
the macroeconomic development, but rather a set of economic trends that
are likely to be induced by the demographic changes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 tries to
give a description and evaluation of the current knowledge on the study of
ageing population using the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ OLG model. The theoretical
model is described in section 3. Section 4 contains the description of the data
used and detalies of the calibration. The main results and implications for
the present analysis are summarised in section 5. Finally, section 6 gives the
conclusions.
2 Literature review
The overlapping generations (OLG) framework was originally proposed by
Samuelson (1958) and later expanded by Diamond (1965). The seminal work
of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) has brought forward a model that is used
to study a wide range of economic issues.
When connecting their work with the existing studies, Krueger and Ludwig
(2007) identify three strands of literature. The ﬁrst one refers to assessments
of the transition path of the economy after a policy change by making use of
large-scale OLG models. In this line of work Altig et al. (2001) analyzed the
economic and welfare consequences resulting from ﬁscal alternatives to U.S.
federal income tax. They are able to assess the gains for diﬀerent income-
groups of agents in the ﬁve alternatives considered and also quantify the
eﬀects of these ﬁscal shifts on the long-run output.
4The second strand of literature used the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ model in a
multi-country framework. This includes among others B¨ orsch-Supan et al.
(2006), Domeij and Flod´ en (2006) and Krueger and Ludwig (2007). In par-
ticular the focus was on world interest rates and capital ﬂows, as the ageing
phenomenon aﬀects world regions with diﬀerent timing.
The third strand (on which this paper also draws) concerns the macroe-
conomic eﬀects of the ageing population in closed economy frameworks.
Nardi et al. (2001) focus on the concept of general equilibrium models in
the study of pension reform under demographic ageing. By relying on pre-
vious empirical studies, they warn about the calculations outside a general
equilibrium framework when quantifying the tax increase needed to ﬁnance
pensions because of the ageing process; the postponement of the retirement
age and the taxation of beneﬁts are suggested in order to alleviate the tax
increase.
By putting in use the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ framework, Miles (1999) studied
the impact of population ageing on the United Kingdom and Europe as a
whole. The simulations were conducted for three cases, depending on the
form of balancing the social security budget. First a constant replacement
rate (pension to wage ratio) is assumed. Then the contribution rate is ﬁxed
and ﬁnally the replacement rate is considered declining gradually to zero by
2040. The last case corresponds to phasing out the public pension system
and the welfare consequences for the young and old generations are discussed.
The author concludes that because only the future generations will beneﬁt
from such a policy change, the majority alive now don’t have the incentive
to support a government who would undertake such a reform.
The author also tries to explain the puzzle of the saving rate for the
older generations. The life-cycle theory predicts negative saving rates for
the retired agents, while micro survey data contradicts it. He argues that
the pension receipts should not be considered income, but a depletion of
assets accumulated during active life. This implies smaller saving rates and
is consistent with the life-cycle theory. The simulation results are used to
5support this hypothesis.
Babeck´ y and Dybczak (2009) provides an assessment for the impact of
the demographic ageing on the Czech economy. The source is valuable be-
cause it concerns an emerging country with a similar proﬁle to that of Roma-
nia. They also follow the approach of two scenarios for balancing the social
security budget (constant contribution rate versus constant replacement ra-
tio) and also study the eﬀects of retirement age modiﬁcation.
A diﬀerent element in their analysis is the open economy assumption,
where they impose as exogenous the interest rate evolution. More speciﬁcally,
they assume perfect capital mobility which implies that the domestic interest
rate is equal to the one on international markets; the results of Miles (1999)
for Europe are considered as the external interest rate. The results obtained
are consistent with the insights of Miles (1999) and advocate for a constant
contribution rate ﬁscal policy because the impact of population ageing is
smaller as compared to the scenario of constant replacement ratio.
Catalan et al. (2008) should also be mentioned in this direction of study,
as they focus on the eﬀects of world interest rate evolution on Cyprus as
a small open economy. Again they consider the interest rate evolution as
exogenous.
3 The model
In this section I present the theoretical foundation of the model employed,
the behavior of its sectors and the equilibrium relationships along with a
description of the numerical implementation.
Among the advantages of OLG models in studying the ageing population
process, Miles (1999) mentions the possibility of undertaking policy simula-
tions. These models have also the property of being theory based and allow
the researcher to assess the results of a wide range of individual behavior
patterns by varying the parametrisation of the model. However it must be
noted that the sensitivity of the model to parameters results in uncertainty
6in the simulations, since the values of some parameters are diﬃcult to assess.
From the beginning it should be noted that the emphasis of the model
on the long term trends is conﬁrmed by its speciﬁcation of variables in real
terms, without considering monetary developments6. The sectors of this
closed model are the households, the ﬁrm and the government, with their
details described below.
3.1 The households
The agents (or individuals) enter the model at age 21 with no initial wealth
endowment and die after T + T R periods, without leaving any bequest. All
the agents with the same age form a generation (or cohort). Therefore, the
total population consists of T + T R unequal coexisting generations, of age
21,22,...,21 + T + T R7. Each household in the economy contains a single
agent8. In the ﬁrst T periods the agent works and afterwards he retires for









where the future utility from consumption and leisure is discounted by the
subjective factor β. According to the adopted notation convention for the
variables, the subscript indicates time and the superscript denotes the age
of the generation. The duration of a period is normalized to 1 with the time
endowment being dedicated to labor (ns






t+s−1 = 1 (2)
The active agent obtains income from work and from lending capital,
leading to the following budget constraint:
k
s+1
t+s = (1 + rt+s−1)k
s






6This is consistent with the long run monetary neutrality
7The model doesn’t take into account agents younger than 21
8I will use these notions interchangeably
7The capital k
s+1
t+s−1 also represents the household’s accumulated wealth,
so the notions are interchangeably used. The next period’s wealth results
after substracting consumption from the wage and current wealth income.
The eﬀective labor supply of the household is ξsns
t+s−1, and is obtained by
multiplying the labor eﬀort ns
t+s−1 with the age-speciﬁc eﬃciency ξs. It
seems natural to assume that the skills and abilities of the representative
agent increase during the ﬁrst part of the working period, reaching a peak
and then stagnating or even slowly decaying. To incorporate this stylized
fact, I introduce the age-productivity proﬁle ξs. The income from wage is
also adjusted with the taxation rate τt+s−1 which represents the percentage
social security contribution collected by the government.
During the T R years after retirement the agent receives pension b giving
rise to a diﬀerent budget constraint:
k
s+1
t+s = (1 + rt+s−1)k
s
t+s−1 + bt+s−1 − c
s
t+s−1 (4)
The pension amount is independent of wage income or time worked during
active life.
3.2 The ﬁrm
The models assumes a single ﬁrm that rents capital and labor from house-
holds to produce a single homogenous good according to a Cobb-Douglas





For the technological progress the assumption of constant deterministic growth
is imposed. Thus, At grows in each period with gA. Taking into account the
capital depreciation rate δ, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts given by:
πt = Yt − rtKt − wtLt − δKt (6)
83.3 The government
The governmental sector is limited to the social security sistem, being
responsible for collecting contributions from the employed households and
distributing them (in the form of pensions) to the retired population. Every








t is the s-year old population. In order ensure the budgetary bal-
ance, the government can adjust either the revenue side, through the social
security contribution rate, either the expenditure side, through the value of
the pension paid. In the second case, the actual instrument is the replace-




(1 − τt)wt ¯ nt
(8)


















In the competitive equilibrium the households are on their optimal path
(maximize their future discounted utility), the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt, the
government has a balanced budget, and the labor, capital and goods markets
clear.
The household’s optimization problem consist of maximizing discounted
sum of future utilities (1) subject to the budget constraints (3) and (4); this
can be solved using the method of Langrange multipliers resulting in the



















where Ul and Uc denote the marginal utility of leisure and consumption. The
ﬁrst of the two conditions states that the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and leisure is equal to the net wage. This FOC concerns
only active agents, since they face the labor-leisure trade-oﬀ. The second
FOC is the well-known Euler equation that relates intertemporal marginal
utility of consumption and aﬀects the decisions of both working and retired
agents.
Solving the ﬁrm’s optimization problem implies a factor market equlib-
rium in which factors are paid with their marginal product. The wage and

















The labor market clears so that the aggregate eﬀective labor Nt that
enters the production function is equal to the sum of individual labor supply
ns
t adjusted with the eﬃciency ξs and also taking into account the size of the
generation P s










The capital market clearing implies that aggregate capital stock is given









Yt = Ct + It = Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt (16)
10Equation (16) states the goods market clearing condition, where aggregate









3.4.2 Balanced growth path
The balanced growth path is deﬁned as an equilibrium in which variables
grow at constant, but possibly diﬀerent rates. The speciﬁcation of certain
growth rates is based on some ”stylized facts” of growth. It was observed
that the average growth rates of output, consumption, capital stock over
long periods of time are very close. This property is known as ”balanced
growth”9. It was also observed that the real wage displays a rising trend
similar to that of output while the interest rate doesn’t exhibit a long run
trend.
In order for the neoclassical framework to be consistent with these styl-
ized facts and to ensure the existence of the balanced growth path, the model
speciﬁcation must fulﬁll some conditions. King et al. (1988) among others10
show that the technological progress must enter the production function in a
labor-augmenting fashion, the utility function must have constant elasticity
of intertemporal substitution and the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure needs to be homogeneous of degree one in consump-
tion.
Consistent with the stylized facts of growth, in the balanced growth path,
output per capita, aggregate capital per capita and aggregate consumption
per capita grow at gA. Also individual variables (the wage, the individual
wealth, the pension and individual consumption) grow at the growth rate of
technological progress.
9Gal´ ı (2005)
10See also Heer and Maussner (2009), p. 67
113.5 The stationary transformation
Usually, it is the evolution of variables without the inﬂuence of an exoge-
nous growth factor, such as the technological progress, that is of interest.
Therefore, it is convenient to express the model in terms of stationary vari-
ables. The stationarization of the model implies removing the deterministic
time trend induced by the technologic progress. Also aggregate variables
will be expressed in per capita terms. Therefore the aggregate variables are
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It is important to note that the stationary-transformed variables represent
deviations from original variables’ long term trend. The balanced growth
path can now be expressed as a steady state in de-trended variables11. The
production function (5) becomes:




Plugging relation (8) into (7) and using the above notations, the government’s
balanced budget condition becomes::













Also, the budget constraints (3) and (4) will be written in the following way:
˜ k
s+1










t+s(1 + gA) = (1 + rt+s−1)˜ k
s
t+s−1 +˜ bt+s−1 − ˜ c
s
t+s−1 (20)
11As Barro and Sala-i Martin (2003) (p. 34) note, the concept of balanced growth path
refers to the state in which all variables grow at constant rates while the concept of steady
state is used for the particular case when the growth rate is zero.
12while the market clearing condition (16) becomes:
˜ Yt = ˜ Ct + ˜ Kt+1(1 + gA)
Pt+1
Pt
− (1 − δ) ˜ Kt (21)
Using the same notations, the ﬁrst order conditions for the household’s op-





































In their seminal work Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) tried to assess the re-
action of the economy following a ﬁscal shock. They assummed the economy
was in a steady state when the shock occured and that it moved to a new
steady state afterwards. The period of interest is between the two steady
states and is referred to as transition period because the economy moves
from one steady state to another. In our case, the shock whose eﬀects are
studied is of a demographic nature.
The implementation requires historical and projected demographic data
for the transition period for every age group between 21 and T + T R; the
detailed description of the data is given in the next section. The numerical
procedure starts by providing initial guesses for the trajectories of the ag-
gregate capital stock per capita and aggregate labor supply per capita for
the selected period. These trajectories allow me to compute (from equa-
tions (24) and (25)) time series for the interest rate and wage. For a given
value of the replacement ratio, I am also able to calculate the time series for
13the contribution rate τt by making use of the balanced budget condition (18).
Consequently, as the sequences of wages, interest rates and contribution rates
that every generation will face are known, by solving the system of FOCs
I can obtain the optimal individual labor supply, consumption and wealth
for every generation. After computing these optimal individual variables, I
aggregate them across generations and compare the aggregate capital stock
and aggregate labor supply with the initial guesses. If they are far from the
starting values, I update the initial guess and repeat the procedure.
A special attention needs to be given to the optimal sequences of wealth,
labor supply, and consumption for the generations that are born before the
beginning of the transition period or die after the end of the transition period.
This is because when aggregating the capital stock and labor supply we need
the optimal allocations of these cohorts.
If the economy is in a steady state at the beginning of the transition
period, then the optimal allocations of the agents alive at this moment are
known. Analogously, for the agents alive after the end of the transition
period, their optimal allocations correspond to the values of the aggregate
variables in the new steady state. The ﬁrst period of the new steady state
is chosen so that the economy has enough time to converge, in our case I
chose 2149. But the assumption of an initial steady state in 2010 is not
very realistic. I overcome this inconvenience by taking Krueger and Ludwig
(2007), among others approach. I assume an initial steady state farther in
the past, in 1950, so that in 2010 all the agents alive are born after 195012.
This way the allocations in 2010 are not aﬀected by the decisions made before
1950.
Heer and Maussner (2009) describe the procedure in detail. They also
provide a set of GAUSS codes for this type of models, which I used after
modifying and adapting them for the features of my application.
12I will assume the agents enter the model at age 21 and live to a maximum age of 80;
the details are presented in section 4
144 Data and calibration
4.1 Data
The demographic evolution is taken exogenous and can be considered the
driving force of the model. Speciﬁcally, the demographic transition inﬂuences
the model through the evolution of the ratio of the population aged 21 +
T + 1 years or over to the population aged 21 or over (which is the total
population in the model). This ratio, which is also the share of retirees in
total population, aﬀects the model outcomes through the balance between
government revenues and expenditures13.
I collected historical demographic data for Romania for the period 1968-
2009 from Eurostat. In order to backcast the series to 1950, I used data from
the United Nations which provides values for every ﬁve years (1950, 1955
...) and interpolated them. From the data obtained after interpolation, I
calculate the growth rates for every generation between 1950 and 1967 and
apply them backward from the last available data from Eurostat, recursively
generating values until 1950.
Eurostat also provides the Europop2008 population projection which goes
as far as 2061. By analyzing the projection, it is noticeable that the ratio of
the population aged 61 years or over to the population aged 21 or over appears
to stabilize at the end of the period (see ﬁgure 1). Given this evolution I
assumed the share of individuals aged 61 years or over in total population
remains constant at 48%, the projected value coresponding to year 2061, for
the next 88 years, until 2149. To transpose this assumption in the detailed
data, I set the sizes of all cohorts for the period 2062-2149 equal to the sizes
of cohorts in 2061 (in other words the population structure remains ﬁxed
after 2061)14. Thus, the ﬁnal data set contains historical data or forecasts
13See for example equation (18)
14This assumption is not too distorting, since the model is inﬂuenced only by the share
15for the population of age s = 21,22,...80+ for the period 1950-2149.
4.2 Calibration
Given the lack of studies for Romania, the parameters of the model had
be calibrated with values documented is the international literature. This
is a serious drawback especially because the model is very sensitive to some
parameters, which leads to uncertainty in the simulations’ outcomes. In
most cases, the values used by Heer and Maussner (2009) were kept, with
replacement made when possible.
The maximum age was set to 80 years, in accordance to other studies
like Babeck´ y and Dybczak (2009), Miles (1999) and also because of the data
availability. However, it should be noted that agents older than 80 years
are also taken into consideration, since the demographic projection includes
them15. Retirement age in the baseline scenario is considered 60 years old,
consistent with current legislation16. Thus, since agents enter the model at 21
years old, in the baseline simulations T is set to 40 and T R to 20. Following





The parameter γ governs the preference for leisure or labor and is set to 2,
while the of relative risk-aversion η is also considered equal to 2.
The subjective discount factor β indicates the preference of current utility
over future utility and is set to 0.99, in accordance with the literature. The
contribution rate τ is set to 0.105, consistent with the current legislation.
The capital share α in the production function is considered 0.3, while the
depreciation rate δ is set to 0.06, consistent with the real business cycle
literature. Following Babeck´ y and Dybczak (2009), a value of 2% per year is
of retirees in total population, and the baseline scenario assumes 60 as the retirement age
15The last age group in the Europop2008 projection consists of individuals aged 80 years
or over
16At present, the retirement age is above 60 for men, and below for women
16associated to gA. For the simulations in which the contribution rate adjusts
in order to insure a balanced budget, the replacement ratio is set to 0.5,
which is approximately the ratio between the average pension and the net
average wage. In the absence of data for Romania, the age productivity
proﬁle is assumed to be quadratic following Miles (1999) and to be given by
ξs = 0.03s + 0.0006s2. As shown in ﬁgure 2 it is hump-shaped and implies
that maximum eﬃciency is reachead at around 50 years.
Figure 2: Age speciﬁc eﬃciency
5 Results
This section presents the details of the conducted simulations and discusses
the results. As mentioned in subsection 3.3, the budgetary balance can be
ensured with the help of two instruments: the contribution rate τ or the
replacement ratio ζ (which in turn aﬀects the value of the pension). I will
consider the extreme cases in which only one of the two instruments adjusts
in order to balance the social security budget, while the other is assumed
constant. This approach has also been adopted by B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2006)
17and Babeck´ y and Dybczak (2009). They suggest that the scenario in which
the replacement ratio is held constant bears strong resemblance to the old-
fashioned pay-as-you-go public pension system, in which the eﬀorts to ﬁnance
the pensions become more and more pronounced.
Because of the rising ratio of retired to employees, the scenario with
constant contribution rate is expected to generate a decline in the pension,
which will provide an incentive for higher private savings. The gradual decu-
mulation of these private savings after retirement can be viewed as a private
pension income. Given that the agents are aware of the future decline in the
public pension, the situation has similarities with the transition to a partially
funded pension system, with a second or third pillar, just as it is happening
in Romania.
The conducted simulations try to quantify also the results of modifying
the retirement age, which is 60 years in the baseline scenario. The current
pension reform legislation stipulates the gradual increase in the retirement
age so that it reaches 65 years in 2030. Therefore I assumed a scenario in
which the retirement age increases with a year at every four years starting
with 201017.
Intuitively, if the replacement ratio is ﬁxed and the number of retired
persons grows as the active population drops, an increase in the contribution
rate is expected in order for the budget to be balanced. Analogously, in the
case of a constant contribution rate, the government revenues will decline
with the labor force resulting in a smaller beneﬁt for the retired. This intu-
ition is conﬁrmed by the expressions for the contribution rate τt and for the
replacement ratio ζt, which result after some manipulation of the goverment’s
budget balacing condition (18):
τt =
ζρt
ζρt + 1 − ρt
(27)
17In the legislation the increase is very smooth, because it uses the month as time unit,




















From equations (27) and (28) it is easily veriﬁable that an increase in ρt
determines an increase in τt and a decrease in ζt respectively, which conﬁrms
our intuition.
Next the results of the conducted simulations are presented. The ﬁgures
on the left side of the page correspond to the scenario in which the replace-
ment ratio is held constant at the value of 50% while on the right side of the
page there are the ﬁgures for the constant contribution rate scenario. The
dashed line illustrates the outcomes for the policy in which the retirement
age gradually increased up to 65 years; the solid line is for a constant retire-
ment age of 60 years. The ﬁrst ﬁgures describe the individual behaviour for
an agent that belongs to the generation that enters the labor force in 2010,
and then the aggregate variables’ path is depicted for the 2000-2100 horizon.
Because the model has been transformed to a stationary form, when
interpreting the results we must bear in mind that the variables (except for
the interest rate and the individual labor supply) are productivity de-trended
and that the aggregate variables are also expressed in per capita terms. The
productivity de-trended variables can be thought of as deviations from their
deterministic trend.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the optimal capital holdings for an agent that
belongs to the generation that enters the workforce in 2010. Consistent with
the life cycle theory, the household accumulates wealth during the working
period in order to ﬁnance expenditures after retirement. The ability to cap-
ture this behavior of the household is one of the advantages of the model.
19As it can be seen, the two policies for balancing the budget provide simi-
lar results, although in the case of constant contribution rate the agent is
encouraged to save more because he expects a smaller pension beneﬁt after
retirement.
Figure 3: Age wealth proﬁle for 2010
labor force entrant - constant replace-
ment ratio
Figure 4: Age wealth proﬁle for 2010
labor force entrant - constant contri-
bution rate
Extending the retirement age (solid line) has somewhat diﬀerent impact
in the two scenarios: the individual saves more in the constant replacement
scenario and less in the constant contribution rate scenario. For this latter
scenario, ﬁgures 8 and 6 provide a completer picture: the individual works
harder to accumulate more in order to compensate the total income drop
through a higher capital income. The agent works harder in the ﬁxed retire-
ment age case as compared to increased retirement age case also because he
will also have to rely on pension for a longer period.
The agent’s wealth is negative in the ﬁrst periods of life, because he is
forced to borrow as he earns a low wage (as unskilled) and has no capital
income. This ﬁnding was reported also by Miles (1999).
When analyzing the optimal individual labor supply (fraction of time
dedicated to work) for the 2010 workforce entrant, shown in ﬁgures 5 and
6, it is noticed that the agent chooses to work less when the relative beneﬁt
during retirement is constant, which is also because taxation is expected to
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Figure 5: Optimal labor supply for











5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
T increasing
T constant
Figure 6: Optimal labor supply for
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Figure 7: Total income for 2010 labor
force entrant - constant replacement
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Figure 8: Total income for 2010 labor
force entrant - constant contribution
rate
smaller than in the constant contribution scenario, his total income after
retirement is still higher due to the generous pension. The pattern of the
individual labor supply follows the evolution of the age-eﬃciency proﬁle, i.e.
agents work more when they are the most productive.
Due to the decrease of the share of working age individuals, the aggregate
employment (shown in ﬁgures 9 and 10) is constantly falling in line with
the demographic transition. Consistent with the ﬁgures 5 and 6, the policy
of constant contribution rate gives rise to a higher aggregate supply of labor
21per capita. Extending the retirement age appears to have only a scale eﬀect
upon labor supply on the aggregate level, as the lines seem translated upward.
The retirement of the baby boom cohorts is easily observed around 2030 as
afterwards the decline in the labor supply is signiﬁcantly faster; this shock is
not eliminated by increasing the retirement age, but only postponed.
Figure 9: Aggregate labor supply -
constant replacement ratio
Figure 10: Aggregate labor supply -
constant contribution rate
As a result of the fall in the share of the cohorts with the highest capital
holdings in favor of older ones with lower levels of wealth (more than 70 years
old) the productivity de-trended aggregate capital stock per capita (ﬁgures
11 and 12) will experience a sharp decline after 2030-2040. In the ﬁxed
replacement ratio scenario, the fall is accelerated by the rising contribution
rate which diminished the net wages.
Also, the aggregate capital stock in the case of constant retirement age
(dotted line) is higher than in the case of extending retirement age in the
ﬁxed replacement ratio scenario and lower in the ﬁxed contribution rate sce-
nario. This ﬁnding is consistent with the individual behavior (wealth pro-
ﬁles for the 2010 labor force entrant) and has been documented also by
Babeck´ y and Dybczak (2009).
The evolution of the interest rate and wage is determined by the trajectory
of the capital to labor ratio, according to equations (24) and (25). For both
scenarios, the aggregate labor supply per capita decreases in the ﬁrst part
of time horizon and then stabilizes, while the de-trended aggregate capital
22Figure 11: Aggregate capital stock Figure 12: Aggregate capital stock
stock per capita increases until 2030-2040 and then experiences a decline.
Consequently, the interest rate falls in both policy set-ups in the ﬁrst part of
the selected period, while afterwards rebounds in one scenario and stabilizes
in the other. In the constant replacement ratio case, the decline in the capital
stock in the second part of the period combined with the steady evolution in
the labor supply leads to the capital to labor ratio to diminish, resulting in
a rising interest rate. The interest rate’s projected evolution is depicted in
ﬁgures 13 and 14.
Since the wage rate depends inversely to the capital to labor ratio relative
to the interest rate, the evolution of the factor prices ˜ w and r are symmetrical,
with the productivity de-trended wage depicted in ﬁgures 15 and 16.
Figure 13: Interest rate: constant re-
placement ratio scenario
Figure 14: Interest rate: constant con-
tribution rate scenario
23Figure 15: Wage - constant contribu-
tion rate scenario
Figure 16: Wage - constant contribu-
tion rate scenario
The evolutions of the contribution rate τ and replacement ratio ζ, shown
in ﬁgures 17 and 18, are consistent with the demographic transition and
the development of the above discussed variables. It is important to note
the advantages of extending the retirement age, as the contribution rate is
smaller and the replacement ratio is above the values for the ﬁxed retirement
age case. The ﬁgures also show how the the baby boom generations put
pressure on the pension system when they reach the retirement age .
In both budget balancing alternatives, the productivity de-trended pen-
sion is expected to decline. In the constant replacement ratio scenario, the
decrease is induced by the smaller wage and by the drop in working popula-
tion. However, the decline is less pronounced than in the constant contribu-
tion rate scenario. In both cases, extending the working life period alleviates
the problem of smaller income after retirement.
Overall, the magnitude of the impact from increasing the retirement age
is diﬀerent in the two alternative scenarios. When considering adjusting the
contribution rate to balance the budget, extending the retirement age has a
small impact, especially on the individual variables.
Therefore, in advocating for the constant contribution rate scenario, which
corresponds to a transition toward a partially funded multi-pillar pension sys-
tem, the advantage of better response to varying the retirement age can be
taken into account. However, the main strengths of this scenario are given
24Figure 17: Contribution rate Figure 18: Replacement ratio
Figure 19: Pension - constant replace-
ment ratio scenario
Figure 20: Pension - constant contri-
bution rate scenario
by the fact that it encourages labor and saving; the evolutions of the aggre-
gate capital stock labor indicate that also the production will be higher in
this scenario as compared to the alternative with constant replacement ratio.
Having in mind that this approach maintains a constant taxation level, while
the other guarantees a higher social security beneﬁt through rising the contri-
bution rate, it could be interpreted that this alternative is closer to a liberal
right-wing economic view; analogously, the approch where the replacement
ratio is constant would correspond to a socialist left-wing economic view.
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In the coming decades Romania will experience a signiﬁcant population
ageing process. Using an overlapping generations model in the spirit of
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), this paper attempted to assess some of the
implications of the demographic change for the Romanian economy.
Following an approach common in the literature, the simulations con-
ducted assumed two extreme cases of balancing the social security budget in
the face of a growing number of retirees: either by raising the contribution
rate in order to maintain the relative beneﬁt after retirement, either by ensur-
ing a constant contribution rate at the cost of smaller pension income. Also
the extension of the retirement age, as proposed in the current legislation
for pension system reform, was taken into account. In both alternatives for
balancing the budget, the rising share of retirees in total population signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀects the simulation outcomes. The demographic evolution which is
considered exogenous and based on the population projection from Eurostat,
is the driving force of the model.
The individual behavior ﬁndings conﬁrm that agents accumulate wealth
during active life in order to dissave after retirement, a pattern also suggested
by the life-cycle theory. In the constant replacement ratio scenario, the
relative size of the beneﬁt after retirement is guaranteed, which stimulates a
low labor supply (given also the high taxation); together with the increase
of the retired generations as share in total population, this leads to a fall
in the aggregate labor supply per capita. The aggregate (productivity de-
trended) capital stock also experiences a decline after 2030-2040, when the
older cohorts (with low wealth) rise as a share of total population and the
contribution rate determines lower net wages. Extending the retirement age
appears to alleviate only marginally and to postpone for a few years shortly
the fall in the pension and the rise in the contribution rate. All the results are
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the retirement of the baby boom generations around
2030, when the ratio of retired to active individuals accelerates.
Maintaining a ﬁxed contribution rate stimulates agents to work and save
26more, as they are aware of the low level of pension income after retirement.
As a result the aggregate employment and capital stock decline less than
in the ﬁxed replacement ratio scenario. As dictated by the evolution of the
capital to labor ratio, the interest rate declines and the wage increases in a
symmetrical manner. Similar to Babeck´ y and Dybczak (2009) ﬁnding, I can
conclude that the impact of ageing is more pronounced when the government
guarantees a relative beneﬁt after retirement than in the constant contribu-
tion rate scenario. This idea is in accordance with the proposed pension
system reforms through shifting toward funded multi-pillar systems18.
The main criticism of the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ model is related to the
strong assumption of the closed economy framework (in the base version of
the model). The solutions to overcome this are the adoption of a multi-
country framework (which is not suited my case), as in Krueger and Ludwig
(2007) for instance, or, when studying a single economy, exogenously impos-
ing the interest rate future development, as in Babeck´ y and Dybczak (2009)
or Catalan et al. (2008). The problem with the second solution is that pro-
viding an exogenous path for the interest rate could be an assumption strong
as the closed economy framework hypothesis.
Another important analysis we have abstracted from in this paper refers
to the study of welfare consequences of the two main scenarios taken into con-
sideration. Assessing which generations beneﬁt more from a policy change is
crucial in understanding the trade-oﬀ faced when designing and implement-
ing a pension system reform.
18The idea of a system with a publicly managed mandatory pillar, a private managed
mandatory pillar and a private managed voluntary pillar was proposed in the inﬂuential
Averting the Old Age Crisis Policy Research Report from The World Bank
27References
Altig, D., Auerbach, A. J., Kotlikoﬀ, L. J., Smetters, K. A., and Walliser, J.
(2001). Simulating U.S. Tax Reform. American Economic Review, 91.
Auerbach, A. and Kotlikoﬀ, L. (1987). Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Babeck´ y, J. and Dybczak, K. (2009). The Impact of Population Ageing
on the Czech Economy. Working Papers 2009/1, Czech National Bank,
Research Department.
Barro, R. J. and Sala-i Martin, X. (2003). Economic Growth. The MIT
Press, 2nd edition.
B¨ orsch-Supan, A., Ludwig, A., and Winter, J. (2006). Ageing, Pension Re-
form and Capital Flows: A Multi-Country Simulation Model. Economica,
73(292):625–658.
Catalan, M., Guajardo, J., and Hoﬀmaister, A. W. (2007). Coping with
Spain’s Aging: Retirement Rules and Incentives. IMF Working Papers
07/122, International Monetary Fund.
Catalan, M., Guajardo, J., and Hoﬀmaister, A. W. (2008). Global Aging
and Declining World Interest Rates: Macroeconomic Insurance Through
Pension Reform in Cyprus. IMF Working Papers 08/98, International
Monetary Fund.
Diamond, P. (1965). National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 55(5):1126–1150.
Domeij, D. and Flod´ en, M. (2006). Population Aging and International
Capital Flows. International Economic Review, 47(3):1013–1032.
Fehr, H., Jokisch, S., and Kotlikoﬀ, L. J. (2008). Fertility, mortality and the
developed world’s demographic transition. Journal of Policy Modeling,
30(3):455–473.
28Gal´ ı, J. (2005). Trends in hours, balanced growth, and the role of technology
in the business cycle. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 87(4):459–
486.
Heer, B. and Irmen, A. (2009). Population, Pensions and Endogenous Eco-
nomic Growth. CEPR Discussion Papers 7172, C.E.P.R. Discussion Pa-
pers.
Heer, B. and Maussner, A. (2009). Dynamic General Equilibrium Modeling.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2nd edition.
Jimeno, J. F., Rojas, J. A., and Puente, S. (2008). Modelling the impact of
aging on social security expenditures. Economic Modelling, 25(2):201–224.
King, R. G., Plosser, C. I., and Rebelo, S. T. (1988). Production, growth
and business cycles : I. The basic neoclassical model. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 21(2-3):195–232.
Kotlikoﬀ, L. J. (1998). The A-K Model: It’s Past, Present, and Future.
NBER Working Papers 6684, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Kotlikoﬀ, L. J., Smetters, K., and Walliser, J. (2007). Mitigating america’s
demographic dilemma by pre-funding social security. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 54(2):247–266.
Krueger, D. and Ludwig, A. (2007). On the consequences of demographic
change for rates of returns to capital, and the distribution of wealth and
welfare. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(1):49–87.
Miles, D. (1999). Modelling the Impact of Demographic Change upon the
Economy. Economic Journal, 109(452):1–36.
Nardi, M. D., Imrohoroglu, S., and Sargent, T. (2001). Saving and pension
reform in general equilibrium models. Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
17(1):20–39.
29Rasmussen, T. N. and Rutherford, T. F. (2004). Modeling Overlapping
Generations in a complementarity format. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 28(7):1383–1409.
Samuelson, P. A. (1958). An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest
with or without the Social Contrivance of Money. Journal of Political
Economy, 66:467.
30